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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2013, 1.004 billion smartphones were shipped, which is an increase of 38.4 percent from 2012 [1] . According to Gartner.com, a fact-based consulting service, 102 billion applications were downloaded globally in 2013. With this industry growth, mobile data attracts interests in many different fields: human behavior analysis, business opportunity exploration, security monitoring, healthcare, and many others. Especially with quickly advancing technology, mobile devices are now capable of performing tasks that embed the collection and tracking of user privacy information. Much of these presumably private data is becoming a driving force behind technology developments as well as business progression. For example, mobile data have been used to understand human communication patterns [2] [3], social relationships [4] [5] , or physical activities [6] .
With the prevalence of background services accessing mobile resources, users unfortunately have little understanding of the possible leakage of security and privacy information. Several studies, e.g., [7] [8] [9] , have demonstrated the threats due to misbehaving applications on mobile smart devices. To address these risks, run-time data should be collected to enable the analysis of background service activities in accessing privacy-sensitive resources on mobile devices. There are certainly challenges to collect such data, since doing so may require intrusive access to the third-party applications as well as privacy-sensitive resources. For an Android system, its sandbox structure prevents one application from monitoring other third-party applications. Furthermore, the data collection agent should impose as little overhead as possible while covering most if not all privacy-sensitive resources, such as camera, SMS, and browser history.
Although much work exists on mobile data collection that emphasizes the use of such data, it was conducted before the sandbox was implemented. There is little understanding of how to monitor run-time privacy-sensitive resource accesses systematically by the third party applications. To address this challenge, this paper describes Panorama, a dynamic run-time privacy-sensitive mobile resource monitoring system, and its uses to provide a better understanding of application behavior on Android. The system combines taint tracking, as implemented in TaintDroid [10] with the concept of action listeners. Taint tracking is a common information flow tracking technique. Sensitive information is labeled, and then the label propagates with the data as the data flow from one sensitive resource to the next. Panorama extends TaintDroid to enhance sequential and deeper resource action-based monitoring.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a review of related work. Section III describes Panorama and its subcomponents. Section IV presents sample results from the data collected using Panorama, followed by the conclusion in Section V.
II. RELATED WORK
TaintDroid [7] was developed to track information sent out of Android devices. A common limitation of TaintDroid and other Android application behavior analysis studies [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] is that they lack monitoring of resourcespecific actions. For example, when a location request is made, the specific steps and resources accessed are not tracked explicitly. This paper reviews a few application behavior analyses below.
Wei et al. [11] developed ProfileDroid: a multi-layer profiling system extracting information from static analysis, user interaction, operating system, and network. It focuses on the application's characteristics and statistics rather than runtime behaviors. The permission requirements and the intents of the app are extracted without running the code. The userapplication interaction (screen touches), the system calls, and the network traffic are some of the features collected. Using all layers they produced better characteristics of the application. However one limitation is that this work looks only superficially at the inter-layer metrics and lacks details about the sequential usage of the application.
Burguera et al. [12] developed a framework to analyze the behavior of Android applications by making use of a crowd-sourcing system to collect traces of applications' behaviors. Their Crowdroid framework allowed the collection of realworld sample data that could be used by researchers to differentiate between benign and malicious applications. The behavior-based malware detection system made use of a clustering algorithm and showed that monitoring system calls is a good feature to use.
Zhou et al. [13] proposed a permission-based scheme to detect malicious applications in the market place. They implemented DroidRanger, a system that combined a "permission based behavioral foot-printing" with a "heuristicbased filtering" scheme to differentiate between malicious applications. The basic properties of the apps are extracted by the system and the app byte code is analyzed to gather more information about the app. A dynamic monitor is used to monitor the application's calls to the Android Framework API. The system calls and their arguments can provide insights about the behavior of an application at runtime.
Isohara et al. [14] provided a brief description of the Android platform and implemented a low-level kernel-based behavior framework for malware detection. Their system makes use of a log collector to gather system calls generated at run time which is filtered and classified in different threat levels. The Android logging system is used to collect a system call log and filter it by identifier. In addition, other data, such as personal identifiers, Android ID, IMEI, SIM serial, etc., are also collected to improve accuracy. The system is able to detect leakage of personal data; however, the log analysis process requires a considerable amount of resources.
III. APPROACH: PANORAMA

A. Overview
The lack of understanding about application and sensitive resource communication presents a need to collect dynamic and timestamp-based data on third-party applications' accesses to various available privacy sensitive resources. Realizing this system-wide sensitive resource access monitoring system presents several challenges:
1. The Android sandbox security structure isolates each application process. The isolation prevents one process from monitoring the activity of other processes.
2. Each available sensitive resource consists of different actions. Locating the necessary resource and actions to monitor in the Android system requires deep understanding of Android process flow and architecture.
3. The monitoring process must work seamlessly in the Android system. The implementations of additional monitoring mechanisms must not require additional information from third-party applications.
To overcome these challenges, Panorama builds on top of TaintDroid [10] to monitor privacy-sensitive information on Android phones. Panorama utilizes the TaintDroid underlying tagging and logging structure to seamlessly distinguish multiple sensitive information types and monitor their activities. Figure 1 shows the system architecture of Panorama, which leverages both TaintDroid's taint tracking as well as its logging system. The overall system is composed of three modules: data collection module, collection client module, and collection server module. The dashed lines specify the integration of the TaintDroid system. Both the data collection module and the collection client module are implemented on the Android device. The collection module is responsible for collecting privacy-sensitive resource communication. Whenever a sensitive resource access attempt is made, the event is logged and passed to the collection client module utilizing the TaintDroid logging system. The client module handles the communication between the collection module and the server module. This is implemented as part of the TaintDroidNotify application package. The client establishes server connection and message transfer. The server module is the only module that resides outside of the Android device. This module is responsible for managing incoming traffic and storing the incoming data. This design allows for modularity and overcomes some of the limitations of previous work.
B. Data Collection Module
The collection module is responsible for monitoring sensitive information flow as well as actions taken by each sensitive resource. Figure 2 shows an architectural view of the data collection module, which is composed of two subcomponents: TaintDroid and sensitive resource listeners. TaintDroid is an information-flow tracking system that automatically labels (taints) data from privacy-sensitive sources. The specific levels of tracking are variable-level, method-level, and file-level. As sensitive information flows through the phone transitively, the labels are applied and propagated. The collection module incorporates TaintDroid by utilizing the TaintDroid logging and tagging system. The shaded areas shown in Figure 2 are adopted from TaintDroid. The specific components in the application framework layer are the resource action listeners. These listeners track specific actions that could be performed by each sensitive resource.
The current implementation of Panorama tracks eleven resources: location, contacts, microphone, phone number, camera, accelerometer, SMS, IMEI, IMSI, ICCID, and browser history. To monitor these resources with different behaviors and functionalities, three types of listeners are implemented:
• Action based listener. This listener is responsible for listening to event initiations to record major milestones along resource access attempts. This type of listener is usually implemented in sensor-related sensitive resources to monitor different stages of the sensor.
• Information based listener. This listener is used to monitor resource events that often trigger an acquisition of information. It is usually implemented in the content resolver and telephony manager components to monitor the acquisition event as well as the requested information.
• Handler based listener. This listener is implemented to monitor the event that a callback method is attached to a resource access. It is usually implemented in the location manager component.
C. Data Collection Client
The collection client module communicates between the data collection module and the collection server module. This component captures the listener logs, formats the events, and then sends them to the server module. The overall architecture is shown in Figure 3 . This module is developed as a third-party application based on TaintDroidNotify [10] . Modifications were made to support event formatting and server communication. This package resides in the application layer of the Android software stack.
There are essentially two components for the client module. The first component is a queue. This queue is driven by two active Android services. One service runs passively in the background to collect all of the incoming resource access events. The collected events are then inserted into the queue. The purpose of the queue is to reduce bottleneck from the formatting process, and to make sure all events are captured. The second service also runs passively in the background to take the logs out of the queue one at a time. Once a log is taken out, it goes through a data formatting process. In this process, information such as application name, IP address, taint tag, timestamp, and data messages are fetched and put into a key value format. The formatted message is then sent to the phone as a notification message and to the data collection server for storage. The communication to the server module is through an HTTP POST request. This is done through the use of Android HttpClient. HttpClient attempts the transfer of data by executing a POST request. If the POST was successful, HttpResponse then receives a success response message.
D. Data Collection Server
The Data Collection Server module is responsible for receiving incoming message strings, processing the message strings, and inserting them into the database. Figure 4 shows the overall server module components and the process flow.
There are three main components for the server module. The tasks of the server module are to receive HTTP POST requests and insert them into the database. The web layer is the outside facing interface. All the webpages and actual displays reside in this layer. Beyond the web layer is the application layer. The application layer handles the communication between the web layer and the database. The application layer is written in PHP to interface with the MySQL database. The application layer establishes connection with the MySQL database with user and password security checks. This layer also handles the parsing of incoming POST requests, which are formatted to fit into the MySQL database schema. The schema follows a very structured layout. There is only one table in the database, since all incoming messages are of the same type. There are a total of five columns in the table. These five columns correspond to the key value structure of the collection client module. The application column stores the application name of each triggered event. The IP column stores the IP addresses of the triggered events. The taint column is the column specifying the type of resources that were accessed. The timestamp column records the exact moment when the resource event was triggered. Finally, the data column records extra data passed by the implemented listeners.
IV. CASE STUDY AND SAMPLE RESULTS
Panorama was implemented and used to conduct preliminary analysis of commonly used Android apps. The following sections describe the experiment setup and observations from the collected data. Panorama incurs very little overhead, an estimate of 8MB per day of data usage and approximately 7% per 6 hours increase in power consumption were observed for the following case studies.
A. Experiment Setup
The overall privacy-sensitive resource monitoring for Android was implemented in Android 4.3 release 1 stock ROM. The finished ROM was installed and tested on a Nexus 4 device. The installed applications were chosen based on their popularity in each app store category [16] . A total of 47 thirdparty applications were installed and tested, for their access of the aforementioned eleven privacy sensitive resources. Table 1 lists the applications installed for experiments and their associated categories for references. The tainted resources include accelerometer, AddressBook (ContactsProvider), IP, SMS, browserhistory, camera, PhoneNumber, Location, ICCID (SIMcardidentifier), IMEI, GPSLocation, MicrophoneInput, IMSI, and NET-basedLocation. The experimentation was designed to observe the passive and active behaviors of third-party applications in terms of sensitive resource access attempts. In the case of collecting data with passive behavior, the third-party applications ran without user actions. The experiment was conducted in a 4-hour time frame. The device was first turned on, and then the phone was left unoccupied for 4 hours while Panorama collected data. After 4 hours, the device was turned off. In the case of data collection for active behavior, the third-party applications were run with a user actively using with the various apps on the mobile device. The experimentation time frame for the active case was also set to 4 hours. The device was first turned on. Then, in the 4-hour time frame, various typical user activities were performed based on the guideline suggested by Ballve [17] .
The experimentation was designed to demonstrate limited use-cases of Panorama, and the results collected and observations made are for these specific cases. Further comprehensive investigation is required to provide generalized understanding and categorization of application behaviors.
B. Privacy-Sensitive Resource Utilization
The first set of results allows the profiling of individual third-party application processes in terms of access volume and accessed resources. Figure 5 displays the number of sensitive resource accesses performed by each third-party application in the passive (top) and active (bottom) modes, respectively. In these test cases, the Weather application accessed the eleven resources significantly more than others, and primarily the location-based resource. In fact, the location-based resource is the most utilized across third-party applications. As indicated by the numbers collected via the 4-hour window in passive and active modes, many applications exhibit comparable amounts of activity even though there is no user interaction. Certainly, user actions drive the type and volume of some of the resource access attempts. The differentiation between the passive and active mode accesses can be an important feature to categorize application behaviors.
C. Privacy-Sensitive Resource Access Intensity
Panorama collects sequential data showing each application's access to each resource over time. Figure 6 plots each application category's access intensity over time in passive (top) and active (bottom) modes. The data suggest that applications tend to have three different intensity access behaviors: single, continuous, and periodic activity. This is shown through the observation of application categories such as Google, News, and Social. Also, comparing the passive and active cases, in some cases, the access intensity shape remains similar but at a higher intensity, (e.g., weather); in other cases, active usage of the applications not only increases the intensity but also alters the access intensity pattern, (e.g., Google, Lifestyle, and News).
D. Network Traffic Analysis
The data collected also enable network traffic analysis in terms of application, application categories, and resources. It is observed that many third-party applications send information to more than one IP address. The outbound traffic is usually composed of location, address book, and IMEI based information. The number of remotely accessed IP addresses increases as the amount of user interaction increases.
Interestingly, certain third-party applications also utilize the same IP address. For example, both Buzzfeed and Facebook send information to the same IP address. The host of this IP address was found to be Facebook. This type of communication suggests another level of privacy concern when applications can collaboratively obtain different privacy information and correlate such information in a remote location.
E. Clustering Analysis of Tainted Resource Accesses
A preliminary study of the tainted resource accesses has been conducted using Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) with Hamming Distance. Hamming distance is chosen to reflect explicitly the applications' usage of different resources. The clustering analysis aims at providing insights on how the applications' run-time activities can reflect the similarities and differences between them. The "active" action sequences are used, and 30 application processes are analyzed. The number of accesses by these applications over the fourhour active period is used as the feature vector for clustering. Figure 7 shows a heat map representing the grouping produced by the AHC; the indices were arranged such that their positions indicate their similarities to the other processes around them. For example, Process 5 (com.android.phone) behaved similarly to Process 29 (jp.naver.line.android) and they are placed next to each other, while Process 24 (com.snapchat.android) is placed farther away from because it behaves very differently. The com.android.phone (5) and the jp.naver.line.android (29) processes are clustered together since they only accessed the AddressBook once over the four-hour period. The Line and the Phone applications are both social/texting applications and would need to access the AddressBook in order to send messages to contacts. The dialer (2) and the inputmethod.latin (3) are also clustered close to (5) and (29) since they also only used the AddressBook resource. The Twitter Media Service (26), Sleepbot (19) and Google Play maps (14) behave similarly in that they used a combination of the Addressbook, IP, location and GPS location, which makes sense for those 3 applications. Another cluster observed was the group of Buzzfeed (7), CNN (8) , and the FIFA App (10), which, recalling Table 1 , all fall under the category of News.
In the Social Category, Snapchat (24) is placed farther away from the other social applications, including Facebook (9) and Twitter (25,26), since it accesses Camera. On the other hand, the Weather application behaved similarly to Facebook and Twitter in that it required the location and gpsLocation resources. One interesting observation with respect to the Weather App is its 47 calls made with 4-hour period to the AddressBook, which is not a resource that the user would expect the Weather App to do. The clustering analysis reveals such run-tine behavior, some of which may be expected and others can trigger further analysis of potentially malicious or privacy intrusive processes.
V. CONCLUSION
Panorama was designed as a modular run-time resource access monitoring system for Android devices. It leverages the existing TaintDroid information flow tracking system and extends it with resource-specific action listeners embedded in each of the resource components. With this extension, Panorama does not require modification to any third-party application. The data collected for the test cases provided insights about the run-time resource access behaviors of thirdparty applications. Even when running in passive mode, some applications still regularly access privacy-sensitive resources. Applications' run-time access to privacy-sensitive resources in passive versus active modes provides insights into its distinct behavior even though the same permissions were granted. In terms of network traffic, the data exhibited that some common remote IPs were used by seemingly different third-party applications. Lastly, using clustering analysis, this work demonstrated the potential use of the collected data, where similar application process behaviors can be identified to complement static analysis of potentially malicious applications.
Panorama provides a privacy-sensitive resource access data collection mechanism that incurs little overhead and requires no intrusive access to third-party application source code. It enables the analysis of application run-time behavior, which can be a useful tool to identify applications that are misbehaving by collecting a user's private information. Further refinement of Panorama can provide additional insights about the exact application initiation process to access resources and, thus, comprehensive application run-time behavior classification.
